Relativists make room for the possibility of “faultless disagreement” by positing the existence of subjective propositions, i.e. propositions true from some points of view and not others. We discuss whether the adoption of this position with respect to a certain domain of discourse is compatible with a realist attitude towards the matters arising in that domain. At first glance, the combination of relativism and realism leads to an unattractive metaphysical picture on which reality comprises incoherent facts. We will sketch the (...) contours of a realist-relativist position called “subjectivism”, which avoids this result by giving up the assumption that the points of view of different subjects are all metaphysically “on a par”. (shrink)

Many philosophers have been attracted to the idea of using the logical form of a true sentence as a guide to the metaphysical grounds of the fact stated by that sentence. This paper looks at a particular instance of that idea: the widely accepted principle that disjunctions are grounded in their true disjuncts. I will argue that an unrestricted version of this principle has several problematic consequences and that it’s not obvious how the principle might be restricted in order to (...) avoid them. My suggestion is that, instead of trying to restrict the principle, we should distinguish between metaphysical and conceptual grounds and take the principle to apply exclusively to the latter. This suggestion, if correct, carries over to other prominent attempts at using logical form as a guide to ground. (shrink)

In this article, I aim at showing how powers may ground different types of probability in the universe. In Section 1 I single out several dimensions along which the probability of something can be determined. Each of such dimensions can be further specified at the type-level or at the token-level. In Section 2 I introduce some metaphysical assumptions about powers. In Section 3 I show how powers can ground single-case probabilities and frequency-probabilities in a deterministic setting. Later on, in Section (...) 4, I move to a theoretical framework where the falsity of determinism is assumed. Within such a framework, I first argue that some probabilities are grounded on basic powers. Moreover, in Section 5, I introduce tendencies and suggest that they are endowed with specific degrees of activation that may change over time. Such degrees explain why tendencies are more likely to be activated than non-activated, or vice versa. In Section 6 I compare my account of tendencies with other accounts. Finally, in Section 7, I anticipate some general objections against my account – objections that it shares with propensity-accounts of probability – and against degrees of activation of tendencies. (shrink)

Solving the meta-problem of consciousness requires, among other things, explaining why we are so reluctant to endorse various forms of illusionism about the phenomenal. I will try to tackle this task in two steps. The first consists in clarifying how the concept of consciousness precludes the possibility of any distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'. The second consists in spelling out our reasons for recognizing the existence of something that satisfies that concept.

Cartesians and Lichtenbergians have diverging views of the deliverances of introspection. According to the Cartesians, a rational subject, competent with the relevant concepts, can come to know that he or she thinks – hence, that he or she exists – on the sole basis of his or her introspective awareness of his or her conscious thinking. According to the Lichtenbergians, this is not possible. This paper offers a defence of the Lichtenbergian position using Peacocke and Campbell's recent exchange on Descartes'scogitoas (...) a framework for discussion. A thought-experiment will be presented involving two communities with radically different conceptions of the metaphysics of the self. The purpose of the thought-experiment is to suggest that a substantive metaphysical thesis, whose truth cannot be a priori known, is presupposed by any justified transition from one's introspective awareness of a certain mental activity to the self-ascription of that activity. (shrink)

There are two intuitions about time. The first is that there's something special about the present that objectively differentiates it from the past and the future. Call this intuition Specialness. The second is that the time at which we happen to live is just one among many other times, all of which are ‘on a par’ when it comes to their forming part of reality. Call this other intuition Egalitarianism. Tradition has it that the so-called ‘A-theories of time’ fare well (...) at addressing the first intuition, but rather badly when it comes to the second. The goal of this article is to offer advice to A-theorists about how to reconcile their view with Egalitarianism. (shrink)

This paper presents a distinctively metaphysical version of the problem of other minds. The main source of this version of the problem lies in the principle that, when it comes to consciousness, no distinction can sensibly be drawn between appearance and reality. I will argue that, unless we want to call that principle into question, we should seriously consider the possibility of accepting the conclusion that other minds are not like our own. This option is less problematic than it might (...) seem at first if we are willing to reconceive facts of consciousness as subjective rather than objective in nature. -/- . (shrink)

Tomando como eje la noción de mímesis aristotélica, en este trabajo me interesa mostrar que es posible distinguir los intereses que animan la reapropiación de dicha noción en la filosofía de Paul Ricœur y que, cada uno de ellos, le otorga a la mímesis un papel diferente en la construcción de la teoría de la narratividad. Siguiendo un esquema triádico, analizaré la irrupción de la mímesis en La metáfora viva, Tiempo y Narración I y La memoria, la historia, el olvido, (...) en un intento por señalar la pluralidad de sentidos que confluyen en la recuperación de Ricoeur. (shrink)

Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar la relevancia de la máthesis para la concepción de la mimesis aristotélica. A partir de las observaciones de la Poética, delimitaré las características del aprendizaje tomando como eje su objeto, modalidad y consecuencias. Para ello analizaré, en primer lugar, el objeto sobre el que recae el aprendizaje mimético, esto es, los hombres que actúan. Luego examinaré la modalidad de presentación de sus acciones para que sea posible el aprendizaje, prestando especial atención al (...) papel que desempeña el error trágico o hamartía. Finalmente, resaltaré los aspectos por los que, a mi entender, la mímesis tiene consecuencias éticas y políticas relevantes en el marco del proyecto educativo de Aristóteles, y que permiten pasar de una consideración de la mímesis en el plano individual a una consideración sobre su función en el ámbito político.: The aim of this paper is to show the relevance of mathesis for the Aristotelian concept of mimesis. From the framework of Poetics, i try to demarcate the characteristics of learning, taking into account its object, modality, and consequences. In order to do this, I will analyze, first, the object of mimetic learning, that is, men who act. Then, I will examine the modality of presentation of their actions that make learning possible, paying special attention to the role played by tragic mistake or hamartía. Finally, I will highlight the aspects on account of which, in my opinion, mimesis has relevant ethical and political consequences in the framework of Aristotle's educational project, and which allow passing from a consideration of mimesis on an individual level to a political level. (shrink)

I wish to prove in this article that Thomas Aquinas was a metaontological pluralist, i.e., that he held that there are many, non-equivalent and irreducible dependence relations in the universe. In this respect, I shall focus on Aquinas' doctrine of the four causes and on the dependence relationships between matter and form in material substances. Subsequently, I shall also reconstruct Aquinas' doctrines by explicitly appealing to metaontological pluralism. I shall explore two routes towards Aquinas' metaontological pluralism: one based on cases (...) of apparent mutual dependence and the other based on the asymmetry of natural priority. Finally, I shall provide two original interpretations of the doctrine of the four causes and of the dependence relationships between matter and form. Such interpretations will be based on the metaphysics of powers. In Section 1 I shall introduce metaontological pluralism and the two routes. In Section 2 I shall examine Aquinas' doctrine of the four causes. In Section 3 I shall provide an interpretation of that doctrine based on powers. In Section 4 I shall consider the dependence relationships between matter and form in material substances. In Section 5 I shall provide an interpretation of such relationships based on powers. (shrink)

I propose to show in this paper how Bosanquet’s aesthetics, in certain of its aspects, conditions William Temple’s reflection on art — a reflection which occupies a central position in Temple’s “Christo-centric metaphysics,” and which finds expression particularly in Mens Creatrix. Bosanquet’s influence becomes still more evident if we compare Temple’s position with the philosophy of art which R.G. Collingwood delineated in the initial phase of his thought, above all in Speculum Mentis and Outlines of a Philosophy of Art.

The current disruption of ecosystems and climate systems can be likened to an increase in entropy within our planet. This concept is often linked to the second law of thermodynamics, which predicts a necessary rise in entropy resulting from all material and energy-related processes, including the intricate organisation of living systems. Consequently, discussions surrounding the ongoing crisis commonly carry an underlying sense of fatalism when referencing thermodynamic principles. In this study, we explore how the understanding of life has been harmonized (...) with thermodynamics to show that entropy production is a consequence of heightened complexity in life rather than its breakdown. Furthermore, it is crucial to perform a thermodynamic analysis of the Earth system as a whole to dispel fatalistic assumptions. The extremum principles linked to thermodynamics do not foretell the precise evolution of complex organisations but rather set the thermodynamic boundaries associated with their development. Ultimately, treating the Earth system as an integrated autonomous entity in which life and human societies play pivotal roles is essential for charting a sustainable path forward for humanity. Understanding how to contribute to thermodynamic states that are more conducive to life, rather than hastening the journey towards chaotic states, is paramount for human survival and well-being in the Anthropocene era. (shrink)

According to Leibniz’s infinite-analysis account of contingency, any derivative truth is contingent if and only if it does not admit of a finite proof. Following a tradition that goes back at least as far as Bertrand Russell, several interpreters have been tempted to explain this biconditional in terms of two other principles: first, that a derivative truth is contingent if and only if it contains infinitely complex concepts and, second, that a derivative truth contains infinitely complex concepts if and only (...) if it does not admit of a finite proof. A consequence of this interpretation is that Leibniz’s infinite-analysis account of contingency falls prey to Robert Adams’s Problem of Lucky Proof. I will argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that, once it is properly understood how the idea of an infinite proof fits into Leibniz’s circle of modal notions, the problem of lucky proof simply disappears. (shrink)

In Sorgner's 2009 paper "Nietzsche, the Overhuman, and Transhumanism", he argues, contra Bostrom, that the transhumanist movement's postman is fundamentally similar to Nietzsche's overman. In this paper, Sorgner's thesis is challenged. It is argued that transhumanism, as presented both popularly and academically, is fundamentally incompatible with Nietzsche's overman, as presented in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. This argument focuses on three significant characteristics's of Zarathustra's description of the overman: the role of earthly existence, immortality, and the rejection of collective values.

I examine and discuss in this paper Orilia’s theory of external, non-symmetrical relations, that is based on ontological roles (O-Roles). I explore several attempts to interpret O-Roles from an ontological viewpoint and I reject them because of two problems concerning the status of asymmetrical relations (to be distinguished from non-symmetrical relations simpliciter) and of exemplification as an external, non-symmetrical relation. Finally, following Heil’s and Lowe’s characterization of modes as particular properties that ontologically depend on their “bearers”, I introduce relational modes (...) in order to define a new solution to the problems of the ontological status of both external, non-symmetrical relations and O-Roles. I also deal with five objections raised by Fraser MacBride against relational modes and O-Roles and I elaborate an analysis of the relations of being to the left of and being to the right of. (shrink)

Children, because of age-related reasons, are a vulnerable population, and protecting their health is a social, scientific and emotional priority. The increased susceptibility of children and fetuses to environmental agents has been widely discussed by the scientific community. Children may experience different levels of chemical exposure than adults, and their sensitivity to chemical toxicities may be increased or decreased in comparison with adults. Such considerations also apply to unborn and newborn children. Therefore, research on children is necessary in both clinical (...) and environmental fields, to provide age-specific relevant data regarding the efficacy and safety of medical treatments, and regarding the assessment of risk from unintended environmental exposure. In this context, the stakeholders are many, including children and their parents, physicians and public health researchers, and the society as a whole, with its ethical, regulatory, administrative and political components. The important ethical issues are information of participants and consent to participate. Follow-up and protection of data should be discussed in the context of biobanks, where children obtain individual rights when they become adults. It is important to realise that there are highly variable practices within European countries, which may have, in the past, led to differences in practical aspects of research in children. A number of recommendations are provided for research with children and environmental health. Environmental research with children should be scientifically justified, with sound research questions and valid study protocols of sufficient statistical power, ensuring the autonomy of the child and his/her family at the time of the study and later in life, if data and samples are used for follow-up studies. When children are enrolled, we recommend a consent dyad, including parental informed consent and the child’s assent and/or informed consent from older minors. For evaluation of the studies including children, a paediatrician should always be involved in the research ethics committee. (shrink)

By using some classical reasoning we show that any countably presented formal topology, namely, a formal topology with a countable axiom set, is spatial.

Under some assumptions on an equational theory S , we give a necessary and sufficient condition so that S admits a model completion. These assumptions are often met by the equational theories arising from logic. They say that the dual of the category of finitely presented S-algebras has some categorical stucture. The results of this paper combined with those of [7] show that all the 8 theories of amalgamable varieties of Heyting algebras [12] admit a model completion. Further applications to (...) varieties of modal algebras are given in [8]. (shrink)

O Argumento da Terra Gêmea Moral (ATGM) é o desafio semântico central para o Realismo Moral Naturalista (RMN). À fim de evitar tal problema, os defensores do RMN têm articulado uma série de réplicas ao ATGM. Neste artigo, abordo algumas dessas réplicas e defendo a tese de que elas não refutam o ATGM. Considero duas propostas em específico: o Argumento da Tradução, de D. Copp, e o Argumento do Fim da Investigação Moral, de A. Viggiano. Apresento essas objeções, mostro em (...) que sentido pretendem responder ao ATGM e argumento que cada uma delas é vulnerável a vários problemas. Concluo que os ataques de Copp e Viggiano ao ATGM devem ser recusados e que o desafio semântico ao RMN persiste. (shrink)

Editorial de la directora de Páginas de Filosofía para el N° 24, Año XXI, en el marco de la pandemia por COVID 19. ARK: ark:/s18537960/wrmvb5ft1.

This paper argues that what is currently the most popular version of temporal Fragmentalism—‘unstructured’ temporal Fragmentalism, as I shall call it—faces a problem of Tensed Belief Explosion. Four possible solutions to this problem are reviewed and shown to be wanting; two more promising ones risk fostering scepticism about the existence of tensed facts—hence, about Fragmentalism itself. The tentative moral is that unstructured versions of Fragmentalism are at best unmotivated and at worst seriously flawed.

I shall explore in this article the metaphysical possibility of powers’ strongly emerging from relations. After having provided a definition of emergent powers that is also based on the distinction between the possession and the activation of a power, I shall introduce different sorts of Relations that Ground Emergence, both external and internal. Later on, I shall discuss some examples of powers that are grounded on their instantiation. Finally, I shall examine the consequences of accepting such relations within a physicalistic (...) ontology and I shall defend them against two objections based on the notion of bruteness. (shrink)

We show that the variety of Heyting algebras has finitary unification type. We also show that the subvariety obtained by adding it De Morgan law is the biggest variety of Heyting algebras having unitary unification type. Proofs make essential use of suitable characterizations (both from the semantic and the syntactic side) of finitely presented projective algebras.

Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument has been thought to be in tension with the doctrine that we enjoy privileged epistemic access to our own mental states. In this paper, I will argue that the tension is only apparent. Friends of privileged access who accept the conclusion of the argument need not give up the claim that our beliefs about our own mental states are mostly or invariably right, nor the view that mental states are epistemically available to us in a way that (...) renders everything within our mind ‘open to view’ – arguably, two main pillars of their doctrine. What they need to reject is the idea that the mental is a realm whose ’determinacy’ or ’fineness of grain’ never escapes our appreciation. This idea – I will suggest – is not essential to privileged access and defenders of the doctrine should not be afraid to give it up. (shrink)

I shall introduce at the beginning of the paper a characterization of strong ontological emergence. According to it, roughly, something strongly emerges from some other thing iff the former depends in some respect on the latter and it some independent of it in some other respect. Afterwards, I shall present my own formulation of strong emergence, which is based on the distinction between the mere possession and the activation of a causal power. Causal powers are the entities to be primarily (...) taken as emergent. Emergent causal powers depend for their possession on their emergence bases, but they are also independent of the latter for their activation. This claim will be defended within some more general assumptions about the metaphysics of powers. Finally, I shall compare the power-based formulation of emergence with other formulations. I shall try to demonstrate that the power-based formulation is metaphysically less controversial than the other formulations. For the power-based formulation does not need to defend the additional thesis that the emergents can depend in some relevant respect on their bases and be independent of the latter in some other relevant respect. Indeed, the distinction between the mere possession and the activation of a power is inscribed in the nature of powers themselves. (shrink)

By means of models in toposes of C-sets (where C is a small category), necessary conditions are found for the minimum quantified extension of a propositional (intermediate, modal) logic to be complete with respect to Kripke semantics; in particular, many well-known systems turn out to be incomplete.

In this paper I consider respects of dependence, namely, the fact that some entities depend on other entities in some respect or another. In the first section, I provide a characterization of contemporary debates on dependence based on respects of dependence. I also single out seven desiderata a good theory of dependence should satisfy and three ways of interpreting respects of dependence. In the second section, I criticize two such ways and, in the third section, I defend the remaining option, (...) namely, that respects of dependence correspond to different dependence-relations between entities. In the fourth section, I develop my theory of Respect-of-Dependence Relations in order to distinguish between partial and full dependence and between specific and generic dependence, and to qualify RD -relations in temporal and modal terms. Finally, in the last section, I anticipate and reply to three objections against dependence pluralism. (shrink)

We prove a generalization of the hyper-game theorem by using an abstract version of inductively generated formal topology. As applications we show proofs for Cantor theorem, uncountability of the set of functions from N to N and Gödel theorem which use no diagonal argument.

This paper defends the view that one's own mental states are metaphysically privileged vis-à-vis the mental states of others, even if only subjectively so. This is an instance of a more general view called Subjectivism, according to which reality is only subjectively the way it is. After characterizing Subjectivism in analogy to two relatively familiar views in the metaphysics of modality and time, I compare the Subjectivist View of the Mental with Egocentric Presentism, a version of Subjectivism recently advocated by (...) Caspar Hare. I argue that the Subjectivist View of the Mental goes a considerable way towards solving certain long-standing philosophical puzzles having to do with the unity of consciousness, the contents of self-awareness and the intransmissibility of experiential knowledge through testimony. (shrink)

In this paper I shall “draw” a sketch of a version of Meinongian Presentism. After having briefly presented some data that presentists need to explain and three problems that typically affect presentism (the triviality objection, the problem of the reference of true propositions’ constituents that seem to involve merely past and merely future objects, the truthmaking problem), I shall clarify the bases of my theory. First, I shall reject the actualist presentist assumption, according to which there are no things that (...) do not exist now. Secondly, I shall introduce some notions (e.g., the ones of tensed properties and of temporal existence) that will be useful in order to clarify the contrast between eternalist and non-eternalist metaphysical theories of time. Thirdly, I shall define Meinongian Presentism. Finally, I shall try to demonstrate that this version can deal with the aforementioned problems and with the presentist data in a serious and perspicuous way. (shrink)